Abstract:

Scientific theories should provide first-order explanations for different kinds of empirical phenomena. Scientific explanations and predictions raise a number of ontological and epistemological problems which are addressed by the philosophy of science. In this sense, philosophy of science is a metatheoretical or second-order enterprise. But what exactly is the relationship between ontology and the philosophy of science?

In my paper, I will argue (1) that ontological hypotheses and theories can provide hypothetical explanations for metaempirical phenomena that we encounter in the philosophy and history of science. For the same reasons (2) metatheoretical phenomena can provide empirical evidence for or against specific ontological conceptions and assumptions. My major example for the first thesis is the principle of causal closure of the physical world (PCC). The principle states that physical phenomena have always physical causes, i.e. only physical phenomena can cause physical effects. PCC provides a logical explanation for a metatheoretical phenomenon, which might be called the explanatory autonomy of physics (EAP). EAP means that physical phenomena can always be explained within physics itself, that is, they can be explained by physical concepts, methods and hypotheses without recourse to any other scientific discipline. EAP is a more or less immediate consequence of PCC, since PCC guarantees that causal explanations of physical phenomena can always be achieved with the help of appropriate physical laws (the so-called laws of motion) that connect physical causes and effects. For the same reason, the explanatory autonomy of physics provides empirical evidence for a physicalist ontology in much the same sense that ordinary empirical phenomena can provide evidence for scientific theories that purport to explain these phenomena. In my paper, I will argue that both aspects of this relationship can be given a precise meaning within the framework of the classical, hypothetico-deductive account of explanation and confirmation.